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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



020 914 585 6 



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Copy 1 



BULGARIA 

An Account of the Political 
Events During the Balkan Wars 



Printed by the 

Macedona-Bul^arian Central Committee 
Chicago, 111., 1919 



TRANSLATOR'S NOTE 



The Bulgarian Government has published 
in French under the heading : "The Bulgarian 
Question and the Balkan States", a long mem- 
orandum, evidently intended to be laid be- 
fore the Peace Conference in Paris, in which 
the case of Bulgaria as against the other Bal- 
kan States is fully and clearly stated. A sum- 
mary of the political events leading to and 
during the Balkan Wars, extracted from the 
Memorandum, with additional official data, 
made public for the first time and relating to 
the circumstances under which Bulgaria was 
led into the world-war on the side of Ger- 
many, has been published likewise in French. 
The present is an English translation of this 
summary. 



iiW «?•» 



1 H (o b I 

^ BULGARIA 



An Account of the Political Events 
during the Balkan Wars 



The Bulgarian political question was put befoi-e Europe 
for the first time in 1876. In that year, in consequence of a 
rising in the district of Philippopoli, a Conference of the rep- 
resentatives of the Great Powers met at Constantinople, the 
chief mission of which was to elaborate a special form of 
government for the Christian populations of European Tur- 
key. The outcome of the deliberations of the Conference was 
a project, instituting two autonomous Bulgarian provinces, 
separated by a vertical line : 

1. Eastern Bulgaria, with the town of Tirnovo as its 
capital, embracing on the north the whole of Dobrudja up to 
the mouths of the Danube inclusively ; 

2. Western Bulgaria, with Sofia as its capital, the west- 
ern boundary of which embraced the region of the River 
Morava with Nish, and extended to the Shar Mountain and 
the Lake of Okhrida in Macedonia. 

In ti'acing this delimitation of the regions inhabited by 
Bulgarians, the Conference was guided by the works of trav- 
ellers relating to European Turkey, and by the reports of 
the Consuls residing in the provinces. It took also into 
consideration the territory over Avhich the Bulgarian National 
Church, instituted in 1870 under the name of Exarchate, ex- 
ercised jurisdiction. 

The territory of the Exarchate comprised in 1876, — speak- 
ing only of tlie regions which today are found outside of the 
Kingdom of Bulgaria — the whole of Dobrudja, the dioceses of 
Pirot and Nish in the Morava region, and the dioceses of 
Skopia (Uskup) Veless and Okhrida in Macedonia. The dio- 



^ 



/ 



ceses of Skopia and Okhrida came under the jurisdiction of 
the Exarchate in consequence of a plebiscite ordered by the 
Turkish Government in 1872, which proved that the orthodox 
population^ of these dioceses was almost wholly Bulgarian. 

The refusal of the Turkish Government to accept the proj- 
ect of the Conference in 1876 brought about the Russo-Turkish 
war. The treaty of San Stefano, which terminated the war, 
created a Bulgarian Principality, the limits of which were 
fixed on the basis of the principle of nationalities, which had 
been previously followed by the Conference of Constantinople. 
However, the political circumstances had brought some modi- 
fications to the frontiers of the project of 1876. The treaty 
of San Stefano detached from Bulgaria two provinces: (1) 
Dobrudja which was given to Rumania as a compensation 
for the three districts in Bessarabia reti'oceded to Russia; 
(2) the Morava region with Nish, which was awarded to 
Serbia as a recompense for the part she had taken in the war 
against Turkey. On the other hand, contrary to the project 
of the Conference of 1876, which, taking into account the views 
of English policy, had deprived the Bulgarians of access to 
the Aegean Sea, the treaty of San Stefano granted to the 
new Principality a window on the Gulf of Salonika — the town 
itself remaining in Turkish territory — and, farther to the 
east, all the seacoast extending from the Gulf of Orfano to 
Booroo-Geul. 

The mistrust of Great Britain respecting the designs of 
Russia on the East and the Mediterranean, designs of which 
Bulgaria seemed to be intended as one of the principal in- 
struments in the future, caused the treaty of San Stefano to 
be submitted to a general revision by the Great Powers. The 
Berlin Congress, convoked with this revision in view, left of 
the big Bulgaria, with its ethnographic limits drawn by the 
Russians, only a reduced principality, comprised between the 
Danube and the Balkan Mountains. South of the Balkans an 
autonomous Bulgaria, called Eastern Rumelia, was estab- 
lished. Macedonia was put back under the direct rule of the 
Sultan and received by the 23rd article of the Berlin Treaty 
a promise of reforms. 

In 1885, in consequence of a coup d'etat which took place 
at Philippopoli, Eastern Rumelia was united with the Bul- 
garian Principality. 

(1) i. e. belonging to the Eastern Orthodox (or Greek Catholic) 
Church. — Translator. 



As to Macedonia, its lot, far from being mitigated, grew 
worse. Its condition Ivept the Bulgarians of the province in 
a growing effen-escence, Bulgaria in a tension every year 
more intolerable, and the Balkan States in a competition more 
and more passionate. This is what has been called "the Mace- 
donian question." 

11. 

It was in the beginning of the ninth century that Mace- 
donia entered within the limits of Bulgaria. Since then it has 
not ceased from participating in the life and the destinies of 
the Bulgarian people. Twice, in the course of the centuries, 
Macedonia was even the sole refuge of the Bulgarian nation- 
ality; (1) at the end of the tenth century, when it formed the 
nucleus of the empire of King Samuel, while Eastern Bulgaria 
with its capital Preslav had succumbed under the blows of 
Byzantium; (2) after the Turkish conquest, when, out of the 
great wreck of what had been Bulgaria, nothing survived but 
the Patriarchate of Okhrida, sole center and symbol of the 
Bulgarian nationality. 

The Bulgarian Patriarchate of Okhrida was abolished by 
the Turkish government in 1767. All the Bulgarian regions 
then passed under the religious authority of the Patriarch 
of Constantinople, and it seemed that henceforth the Bul- 
garian nationality would be simply a historical reminiscence. 
But Providence decided otherwise. At the very time of the 
suppression of the Okhrida Patriarchate the moral move- 
ment, called the Bulgarian awakening, began. 

It is well known that tlie spark of the Bulgarian awakening 
was lighted by a Macedonian monk, Paissi, author of a history 
of the Bulgarians (1762), which was circulated and read 
secretly in manuscript in the Bulgarian lands, inflaming every- 
where the souls of men. It was also the Macedonians who, in 
the first decades of the XIX centuiy, composed and published 
the first books in the modern Bulgarian language. 

The first mm of the Bulgarian national movement was lib- 
eration from the yoke of the Greek Patriarchate and the con- 
stitution of an independent Church. In this direction also 
the first initiative came from Macedonia. It was in 1829 that 
the TowTi of Skopia demanded from the patriarchate at Con- 
stantinople a bishop of Bulgarian nationality. A like demand 



was formulated by the Town of Tirnovo, the ancient capital 
of Bulgaria, ten years later. 

In the struggle which began since then between Hellen- 
ism, represented by the Patriarchate at Constantinople, and 
the Bulgarian people, Macedonia took the most impoi'tant 
and the most difficult part. The Greeks were in fact inclined 
to make concessions to the Bulgarian movement everywhere, 
except in Macedonia, which they considoi-ed as a geographical 
annex of Greece and hence an intangible patrimony of Hel- 
lenism. In fact, in 1867, the Greek Patriarch declared him- 
self ready to recognize the existence of a Bulgarian national 
church, provided it did not include the dioceses of Macedonia. 
The Bulgarians rejected this offer; they demanded for their 
church a territory delimited on the principle of nationalities. 
Several attempts at a direct argument between the Greek 
Patriarchate and the Bulgarians having failed, the Turkish 
government settled the question authoritatively, and insti- 
tuted by the firman (Imperial decree) of 1870, the Bulgarian 
Exarchate. 

Of all the dioceses of Macedonia the firmmi of 1870, placed 
imder the jurisdiction of the Exarchate only two, that of 
Kustendil-Shtip and that of Veless; but the tenth article of 
the firman provided that every diocese, Avhere by the way of a 
plebiscite, the presence of a Bulgarian majority of two-thirds 
should be established, could by right pass under the authority 
of the Exarch. The fear of seeing, in a near future, all Mace- 
donia enter by way of a plebiscite the territoiy of the Exar- 
chate, drove the Greeks to a new concession: The Greek 
Patriarch proposed to the Bulgarians to cede to them the 
dioceses of Skopia, Veless, Okhrida and the northern part of 
the diocese of Monastir, on condition that they waived their 
claims to the other dioceses of Macedonia. This new proposi- 
tion was likewise rejected, the Bulgarians accepting no solu- 
tion outside of the principle of nationalities. This refusal 
determined the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople to sum- 
mon a local council, which declared the Bulgarians schismatics 
for having wished to introduce into the Church ethnophyletism 
or the idea of nationality. 

In 1876 three Macedonian dioceses, which comprised almost 
the whole of Macedonia west of the River Vardar. formed 
part of the Exarchate. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war 
(1877-78), the Turkish government recalled the Bulgarian 



bishops of Skopia, Veless and Okhrida. After that war, the 
hostility of the government to the Bulgarians was so strong, 
that many years passed ere the Exarchate was allowed^ to 
send Bulgarian bishops to Macedonia. In the end, its resist- 
ance gave way under the pressure of the Bulgarian popula- 
tion of Macedonia, which by great popular manifestations 
demanded the putting in force of the jMbiscite. Successively, 
seven Macedonian dioceses were granted Bulgarian bishops, 
namely, Skopia, Veless, Strumitza, Nevrokop, Monastir, 
Okhrida and Dibra. 

The regions of Southern Macedonia, peopled by a Bul- 
garian majority as the rest of the province, were unable, in 
spite of their constantly renewed applications, to obtain 
bishops named by the Exarchate, because the Turkish govern- 
ment, faithful to its traditional policy, wished to keep up as 
long as possible the Greco-Bulgarian antagonism. Neverthe- 
less, the progress of the national Bulgarian organization con- 
tinued in Southern Macedonia just as spiritedly as in the 
Northern. This progress was particularly remarkable in the 
districts of Kukush (Kilkich), Yenidje-Vardar, Voden (Vo- 
dena), Costoor (Castoria) and Lerin (Fiorina), where the 
preponderating character of the Bulgarian element asserted 
itself in every respect, as the statistics testify. This induced 
the Turkish government to grant to the Bulgarians of South- 
ern Macedonia also seven bishops' vicars. 

Receding constantly before the Bulgarian impetus, Hellen- 
ism has retired in the end within its natural limits, that is, 
within the regions really inhabited by the Greek race. Now, 
as all f oreigTi travellers, ethnographers, and geographers have 
affirmed — Pouqueville, Cousineiy, Felix de Beaujour, Ami 
Boue, Lejean, Elisee Reclus, to cite only the French — the 
Greeks inhabit in Macedonia a narrow strip, intersected here 
and there, along the Aegean seacoast, and some isolated points 
in the interior, which form, amidst the Bulgarian mass, ethno- 
graphic islets. 

III. 

The Bulgarian people of Macedonia had already achieved 
their emancipation from the yoke of the Gi'eek Patriarchate, 
when they were suddenly called upon to defend themselves 
against the unexpected attack of a propaganda organized by 
Serbia. 



8 

The Serbians had always considered Macedonia as part of 
Bulgaria. In their ethnographie maps, in their historical 
books, in their school textbooks, Macedonia figured invariably 
as a IBulgarian country. When the Bulgarian awakening in 
Macedonia began, it found a most sympathetic echo in the 
Serbian press. An exalted mind, a certain Miloyevitch, 
claimed, it is true, in 1866, that there were Serbians in Mace- 
donia; but his claim raised general indignation. In his rem- 
iniscences published in 1889, in the Serbian magazine 
"Srbstvo," he himself says: "I came very near being ostra- 
cized or being shut up in an insane asylum." At the same 
time, another Serbian, Verkovitch, a learned man, published 
a collection of folklore, entitled "Popular Songs of the Bul- 
garians of Macedonia." For this collection, in the preface 
of which he asserted that the Macedonian Slavs were of Bul- 
garian nationality, Verkovitch was elected a corresponding 
member of the Society of Serbian Learned Men, which is now 
called Serbian Academy of Sciences. 

Up to the Busso-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Serbian gov- 
ernment also considered Macedonia as a Bulgarian countrj'. 
Hence, it showed no dissatisfaction when the Conference of 
1876 included the greater part of Macedonia, with Skopia, 
Okhrida and Monastir, within the boundaries of Western Bul- 
garia. The Serbian government also saw nothing unnatural 
in the extension of the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church 
to Macedonia. 

"Up to 1885, Serbia had never thought of Macedonia." 
This sentence was written by Mr. Milovanovitch, late former 
Minister President of Serbia, and is found in an article pub- 
lished by him in 1898 in the Serbian magazine "Delo." The 
admission puts logically an end to all controversy about the 
nationality of the Macedonian Slavs, for if Macedonia had 
been Serbian, Serbia would not have waited till 1885 to become 
cognizant of it. 

Why, after having so long and so completely shown no in- 
terest in Macedonia, has Serbia suddenly made it the principal 
object of its policy"? The explanation is found in one single 
fact. Up to the Berlin Congress, the Serbian designs for 
expansion were directed towards Bosnia and Hersegovina. 
The occupation of these two provinces by Austria-Hungary 
having shattered their hopes of aggrandizement in that direc- 
tion, the Serbians fixed their choice upon Macedonia. Vienna 



strongly encouraged them in the new policy. In 1882, the 
Serbian goveniment concluded with Austria-Hungary a secret 
convention, by which Serbia bound herself not to permit on 
its territory any agitation on the subject of Bosnia and Herse- 
govina, whilst Austria-Hungary promised to support the Ser- 
bian pretensions to the Vardar Valley. 

The serious internal troubles stirred up by the Radical 
party against the Obrenovitch dynasty in 1883, the aggression 
of Bulgaria by Serbia in 1885, the political crisis which fol- 
lowed the Serbian defeat and which ended only with the abdi- 
cation of King Milan, did not allow the Serbian goveniment 
to carry out immediately its plan of action in Macedonia. This 
plan began to be put into execution in 1889. 

IV. 

To oppose the Serbian propaganda was for the Bulgarians 
of Macedonia a secondary task. Their principal effort, since 
1893, was directed towards the political emancipation of the 
province and its union with Bulgaria. The cultural period 
of the Bulgarian awakening in Macedonia was followed by a 
rovolutionarj'- period. 

The first Bulgarian rising in Macedonia took place in 1879. 
This insurrection in the Struma Valley was organized, as the 
English Blue Book shows, by Macedonian Bulgarians, who 
had fought in the Bulgarian legions fonned by the Russians 
during the Russo-Turkish war. 

This first revolutionary attempt was followed by a certain 
lull, broken from time to time by local effei'vescences. In 
1893, the revolutionary movement took an organized form. 
In that year, in the small town of Ressen (Resna), situated 
near the Lake of Prespa, a secret society was formed, the ob- 
ject of which was the emancipation of Macedonia by force of 
arms. This society gave being to the Internal Organization, 
which established its committees in all the towns and villages 
of Macedonia, and constituted a kind of State in the State. 

The first result of the revolutionary agitation undertaken 
in Macedonia was the insurrection of 1895. This insurrection 
was quite remarkable, but did not attain the end it had in 
view, namely, the intervention of the Powers. Seven years 
were spent in preparations for a general uprising. In 1902, 



10 

a part of the committees, impatient for action, proclaimed a 
revolution in eastern and northern Macedonia. The move- 
ment was not general, but it was serious enough to bring the 
Macedonian question to the notice of Europe. Two of the 
great Powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary, made comliined 
applications to the Turkish Government for the introduction 
of reforms into Macedonia. 

The Austro-Russian intei-vention took place in 1903, in the 
month of February. Five months later, the great insurrection 
broke out. The French Yellow Booh and the Italian Green 
Book designate as centers of the revolutionary movement the 
districts of Egri-Palanka, Pekhtchevo, Shtip, Prilep, Monas- 
tir, Krushevo, Costoor (Castoria), Lerin (Fiorina), Voden 
(Vodena) and Yenidje-Vardar. The English Blue Book fixes 
the number of the insurgents at 32,000. 

The exclusively Bulgarian character of the Macedonian 
revolutionaiy movement is attested by the English diplomatic 
correspondence as well as by the Yelloiv Bonk and the Green 
Book. According to a report from the French Consul at 
Monastir, the Greeks were hostile to the liberation movement, 
and systematically denounced the Bulgarian revolutionaries 
to the Turkish authorities. As to the Serbian propaganda, it 
held itself, according to the same consular report, in great 
reserve. 

The insurrection of 1903, in which several thousands per- 
ished and 127 Bulgarian villages were destroyed, brought 
about a general intei-vention of the Great Powers, and resulted 
in the establishment of an European control in Macedonia. 
This control, the principle of which was first formulated by 
France and which, thanks to the action of England, France 
and Italy, grew broader every year, would have ended in an 
autonomous regime, especially after Russia had given its ad- 
herence to it, had not the Young-Tvirks ' revolution in 1908, 
put an end to the work of the reforms, and thus brought the 
Macedonian question back to its starting point. 



The Young-Turks' revolution raised great hopes in the 
idealistic circles of Europe; but it did not take a long time 
to undeceive all these illusions. The new regime undertook 
nothing in the direction of liberty ; the only thing to which it 



11 

devoted itself sincerely was the militaiy power of the empire. 
The plan of the Young-Turk Committee was really to provoke 
one by one all the Balkan States, and beat them separately. 
Bulgaria replied to this program by taking the initiative in 
the formation of a Balkan Alliance. On February 29 (or 
March 13) 1912, she sigiied with Serbia a treaty of alliance, 
completed successively by three militaiy conventions. On 
May 16/29, 1912, a treaty of alliance was likewise concluded 
between Bulgaria and Greece. Into the coalition thus formed 
and completed, Montenegro, with which Bulgaria established 
a verbal agreement, was also drawn at the last moment. 

Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were not bound with each 
other; each one of these states had treated separately with 
Bulgaria. This is the best proof that the initiative for the 
Balkan Alliance came from Bulgaria and that it formed its 
nucleus. 

The object which Bulgaria proposed for the Balkan Alli- 
ance w^as the introduction into Macedonia of an autonomous 
form of government. This program did not please at all 
Greece and Serbia. For these two States the establishment 
of autonomy in Macedonia was tantamount to the certain loss 
of the province which, under a free regime, would have spon- 
taneously assumed the physiognomy of a Bulgarian State. 
Besides, the Serbians as well as the Greeks had always been 
in favor of a division of Macedonia. In order to facilitate 
the negotiations, Serbia consented in the end to admit in prin- 
ciple the autonomy, on condition that a provision should be 
made for a division, in case autonomy should be denied "im- 
possible in view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and 
Serbian nationalities, or owing to other internal or external 
causes. ' ' In her tuni, Bulgaria rejected the idea of a division ; 
but finally she also had to swerve from her point of view. So 
the treaty was concluded on the following basis, which was 
formulated in article 2 of the Secret Annex of the treaty : 

"Serbia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to the territory 
east of the Rhodope Mountains and the River Struma; Bul- 
garia recognizes the right of Serbia to the territory lying 
north and west of the Shar Mountain. ' ' 

The territory comprised between the Aegean Sea, the 
Struma, the Rhodopes and the Shar Mountain was cut by a 
line starting in the north from Kriva-Palanka and reaching 
to the Lake of Okhrida. Serbia expressly renounced all claims 



12 

to all the territory to the east and south of this line. The 
exact text of the passage relating to this renunciation reads 
as follows : 

"Serbia binds herself to formulate no claim to the terri- 
tory situated beyond the line, traced on the map hereto at- 
tached, and which, starting at the Turko-Bulgarian frontier, 
at Mount Golem (north of Kriva-Palanka), follows a general 
southwestern direction to the Lake of Okliiida, passing 
through Mount Kitka, etc." (The line is outlined in detail.) 

The territorj^ situated to the west and north of the line of 
Kriva Palanka-Okhrida was to be submitted to the arbitra- 
tion of the Russian Emperor, who could award it wholly to 
Serbia or Bulgaria, or portion it out between the two States. 

With Greece, Bulgaria concluded no territorial agreement. 
The political treaty signed by the two States on May 16, 1912, 
was only completed on September 22d, by a military conven- 
tion. 

While the Balkan States were forming this coalition, their 
relations with Turkey became more and more strained. At 
the approach of autumn, the conflagration appeared imminent, 
and in fact it broke out on October 18, 1912. 

By reason of its geographical position, Bulgaria had to 
bear the principal burden of the war. She had to stand the 
onset of the bulk of the Turkish forces, which were massed 
in Thrace in order to defend the approaches to Constanti- 
nople. The rapid advance of the Bulgarian offensive, the 
brilliant victories at Kirk-Klisseh and Luleh-Burgas and the 
irresistible drive on to Tchataldja, where an armistice stopped 
the military operations, are matters of common knowledge. 
In comparison with the great exertions of Bulgaria, the task 
of Serbia, which fought on a secondary theater of war — 
the Vardar Valley — was relatively easy; much easier was 
the role played by Greece. 

The peace negotiations entered into by the belligerent 
States in London having failed, hostilities were resumed on 
February 3, 1913. Bulgaria found herself again face to face 
with an overwhelming task. She had to hold, at Tchataldja 
and in front of Bulair, the whole Turkish army reorganized 
during the armistice and constantly increased by reserves 
brought over in all haste from Asia Minor. However, for 
Greece — aside from the siege of Yanina where a small Turkish 



13 

garrison had shut itself up — and for Serbia — aside from the 
two divisions she lent Bulgaria for the investment of Adrian- 
ople — the war was finished. The Serbian and Greek armies, 
which in the course of the military operations, had occupied 
Macedonia, divided between themselves the province and in- 
stalled themselves in it as masters. 

The resumption of the war was marked by new Bulgarian 
successes at Bulair, where a Turkish army of 60,000 men was 
beaten, and at Sharkeuy, on the coast of the Sea of Mannora, 
where the twelve battalions of Macedonian volunteers re- 
pulsed in a most bloody battle the tenth army corps which 
had landed there. On March 26th, the fall of Adrianople, cap- 
tured by assault, closed the cycle of Bulgarian victories. This 
last resistance broken, peace could not be delayed any longer. 

Unfortunately, in proportion as peace was drawing nearer, 
the relations between the Balkan Allies became more and more 
strained. Taking advantage of the fact that Bulgaria had to 
remove troops from the regions east of Salonika in order to 
reinforce its array against Turkey, the Greeks kept driving 
back the Bulgarian outposts, and the latter retiring by order, 
the Greek occupation little by little was extended to the heights 
of Pangeon that dominate the Gulf of Cavalla, This Greek 
advance was not made without causing incidents which justly 
alarmed the friends of the Balkan Alliance. 

More serious and more pregnant with consequences was 
the conflict which arose between Bulgaria and Serbia. 

The Serbo-Bulgarian AlUanee was signed in February 
(o. s.) 1912 by the Serbian Minister Milovanovitch ; but 
shortly after this historical event, the eminent Serbian states- 
man died. His place, at the head of the Serbian foreign pol- 
icy, was taken by Mr. Pashitch, who did not show in the ob- 
servance of the alliance the faithfulness which Bulgaria had 
hoped for. The first breach caused by Pashitch to the bases 
of the alliance was his circular despatch (No. 5669) of Sep- 
tember 28, 1912, addressed to the Serbian diplomatic corps 
abroad, in which he claimed Prilep, Kitchevo and Okrida, 
towns situated in the territory to which Serbia had expressly 
waived all claims in her treaty with Bulgaria. This despatch 
was sent on the very eve of the war against Turkey. The 
Serbian army having occupied Macedonia, the proposition of 
Pashitch not to comply with the treaty of 1912 became more 
precise. As soon as the armistice with Turkey was con- 



14 

eluded the commander-in-chief of the Serbian army, in agree- 
ment with the chief of the Government, gave orders to the 
troops to fortify themselves on a line starting from to 
Ossogova Mountain and reaching to the heights in front of 
Shtip. From that moment the Serbian ruling spheres, deter- 
mined not to execute the treaty of 1912, but to keep Mace- 
donia, foresaw a war with Bulgaria and began to make prep- 
arations for it. 

While Serbia was taking these military measures, she at 
the same time Avas negotiating with Greece for an alliance 
against Bulgaria. The first exchange of views between these 
two States took place in January, 1913, according to the rev- 
elations published in the Athens newspaper "Nea Himera," 
over the signature of the Greek publicist, G. Vassilas. The 
basis of the negotiations was the exclusion of Bulgaria from 
the larger part of Macedonia and the division of the province 
between Serbia and Greece. On May 5, 1913, a protocol, con- 
taining the principles of an understanding between Serbia 
and Greece, was signed by Boshkovitch, the Serbian Minister 
at Athens, and Coromilas, the Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. This protocol was followed by a treaty of alliance, 
concluded on May 19 (June 1). 

The essential clause of this treaty is the one stated in 
Article 4, which traces the future frontier between Bulgaria 
on the one hand and Serbia and Greece on the other. The 
following is the exact text of this clause, as it appears in the 
text of the treaty published by Venizelos in the Greek White 
Book, laid before the Greek Parliament on August 17, 1917 : 

"The two high contracting Powers agree that the Greco- 
Bulgai'ian and Serbo-Bulgarian lines of frontiers will be es- 
tablished on the principle of effective occupation and the equi- 
librium among the three States as follows : 

"The Eastern Serbian frontier starting from Gevgeli will 
follow the course of the River Axos (Vardar) up to the con- 
fluent of Bojimia-Dereh, will ascend this stream and passing 
through the 'hills 120, 350, 754, 895, 571 and the Rivers Kriva- 
Lakavitsa, Bregalnitsa and Zletovska, will proceed towards 
a point of the old Turko-Bulgarian frontier over the Osso- 
gova Mountain, hill 2225, following the line given in detail in 
the II annex of the present treaty." 

From this text, as far as Serbia is concerned, two things 
stand out clear: (1) to the treaty of 1912, based on the prin- 



15 

ciple of nationalities, Serbia was substituting tbat of equilib- 
rium and effective occupation; (2) the Serbian frontier took 
in not only the contested zone, on which the Russian Tsar 
was to arbitrate, but also the larger part of the zone on this 
side of the. line Kriva Palanka-Okhrida, to which Serbia had 
expressly waived all claims in the treaty of 1912. 

This compact against Bulgaria was concluded, as is proven 
by the protocol of May 5, 1913, before peace with Turkey had 
been signed, and while the Bulgarian anny, relying on the 
faith of the plighted word, was fightmg at Tchataldja and 
Bulair in the belief that it was battling for the liberation of 
Macedonia. 

But Serbia and Greece were not satisfied with only 
leagTiing themselves against Bulgaria. They endeavored, 
from the very outset, to draw Rumania into the coalition. 
They wanted to draw even Turkey into the plot. On June 8, 
1913, the Rumanian Premier, in a report to the late King 
Carol published in the Rumanian Green Book, wrote : 

"Today at ten o'clock in the forenoon, the Greek Minister, 
Mr. Papadiamantopulos, came again to speak to me about 
an alliance with Greece against a too great expansion of 
Bulgaria, and added that such an alliance could be foraied by 
including also Turkey. I told him that as far as Turkey was 
concerned, I believed it to be more prudent to wait till its 
internal situation was consolidated. As to drawing closer 
to Greece, I put off my reply to a later date, when the Balkan 
frictions will have become more accentuated." 

While this conspiracy was being woven around Bulgaria, 
the Bulgarian Goveniment, hoping against all evidence that 
Serbia would revert to a realization of her obligations, was 
addressing to Petrograd urgent requests for the emperor to 
undertake" his function as arbiter. The Russian government, 
however, thought that the Tsar could not assume this role 
before getting the consent of Serbia. But Pashitch, who, 
after the signing of the treaty with Greece, considered the 
question settled in the sense that Serbia was to keep at any 
rate Macedonia, did not accept arbitration, except on condi- 
tion that the whole treaty of 1912 be submitted to a revision. 
Meanwhile, the conflict taking a turn more and more alarm- 
ing, — because the Bulgarian army had been transferred from 
Thrace to Macedonia and was facing the Serbians — Russian 
pressure at Belgrade in favor of arbitration became more em- 



16 

phatic. Then, fearing lest Pashitch should give way under 
the injunctions of Russia, the Serbian High Military Com- 
mand, m order to cut short the negotiations, decided to let 
loose the war. The attack was to be made on June 26th. An 
officer of the French Military Staff, who has written a study 
of the Second Balkan War according to documents furnished 
to him by the Serbian Headquarters, has published in the 
Revue Bleue of 1914 the orders of General Putnik, the Ser- 
bian Commander-in-Chief, for the offensive. At the last hour, 
the intervention of Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Bel- 
grade, put off the conflagration ; but the danger was not there- 
by lessened, for Bulgaria was demanding the execution of 
the treaty of 1912 with as much insistance as Serbia was show- 
ing on violating it. 

Extreme excitement, it is true, prevailed in Sofia. The 
news announcing an imminent annexation of Macedonia by 
Serbia produced in all hearts a painful emotion. Expecting 
from hour to hour to hear from Petrograd that the Emperor 
would pronounce for the arbitration, the Government was 
opposing by all means the popular current which saw no other 
issue but war. Unfortunately, the baleful suggestions of cer- 
tain circles succeeded in taking possession of the spirit of 
General Savoff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian 
army, who, without consulting with the Government, ordered 
on June 29th the Fourth Bulgarian Army to attack the Ser- 
bian positions in Macedonia. 

It was with an unutterable emotion that the Bulgarian 
Ministry learned that Bulgaria had been pushed into a war 
which the Serbians had done so much to render necessary, 
but which honor and good sense equally condemned. The 
first action of the Government was to order the irmnediate 
cessation of hostilities ; at the same time General Savoff was 
was relieved of his office and replaced by General Radko 
Dimitrieff. 

Serbia, though informed in time of the decision taken by 
the Bulgarian Government, refused to stop on its side the 
operations. In its turn, Greece entered the war. Rumania 
which demanded a part of the Bulgarian territory bordering 
upon Dobrudja mobilized shortly after and invaded Bulgaria. 
At the same time the Turkish army, breaking the peace, reoc- 
cupied Thrace and arrived at the old Bulgarian frontier. The 
coalition formed by Greece and Serbia attained the end it had 
set to itself. 



17 

Assailed on all sides, Bulgaria asked to come to terms. 
Negotiations were entered into at Bucarest, where peace was 
signed on August 10, 1913. 

By the treaty of Bucarest, Rumania acquired a whole 
province of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, with the towns of Silis- 
tra, Tutrakan, Dobritch and Baltchik; Serbia and Greece 
took the whole of Macedonia, except some scraps of this prov- 
ince which were left to Bulgaria. The victors profited by their 
victory even beyond the limits they had set themselves pre- 
viously. Thus, Greece, which in its secret treaty with Ser- 
bia had pushed its eastern frontier to the Gulf of Eleftera 
and had consequently left Serres, Cavalla and Drama to Bul- 
garia, was given by the treaty of Bucarest these three towns. 
In vain the Bulgarian delegates urged (1) that Cavalla was 
the natural port of Sofia; (2) that eastern Macedonia, which 
constitutes the hinterland of Cavalla, is inhabited by an in- 
contestable Bulgarian majority; (3) that outside of Cavalla 
Bulgaria would have no port really available on the Aegian 
seacoast. Venizelos' reply was that he for his part acknowl- 
edged that Cavalla, of little use to Greece, was indispensible 
to Bulgaria; but, he added, the formal orders of King Con- 
stantine forbade him to sign peace on any other condition. 

In the first days of the negotiations, Rumania had inter- 
posed to let Bulgaria have Cavalla. King Carol had even told 
the Bulgarian delegates that this port would be given to 
Bulgaria. But, at the last moment, Rumania changed en- 
tirely her attitude ; in the meantime. King Carol had received 
from Emperor William a haughty telegram in which the lat- 
ter informed him of his wish that Cavalla should be left to 
Greece. This intervention, dictated not so much by the Kai- 
ser's sympathies for his brother-in-law as by the idea of de- 
priving Bulgaria of a sufficient outlet on the Aegian Sea and 
making her economically dependent on Central Europe, was 
decisive. Thereupon, the Rumanian Premier Majoresco told 
the Bulgarian delegates that if they did not sign peace with- 
out Cavalla, the Rumanian army would enter Sofia. 

The Bulgarian delegates, however, signed only after the 
conference had put on record the declaration of Russia and 
Austria-Hungary that the treaty of Bucarest would be re- 
vised in regard to Cavalla. 

Unable to prevent so many Bulgarian provinces from be- 
ing torn away from the mother country and thrust under a 



18 

new thraldom, the Bulgarian delegates tried to obtain for the 
Bulgarians, who had become subjects of the neighboring 
States, a safeguard for their nationality. They proposed to 
the conference the insertion into the treaty of an article giiar- 
anteeing, in the newly annexed territories, freedom of schools 
and autonomy of religious communities. Owing to the oppo- 
sition of the Serbian delegates, this motion was rejected, al- 
though the Greek delegates had previously agreed to it. 

The events soon showed how Avell founded had been the 
anxiety that had inspired the Bulgarian proposition. In fact, 
in Dobrudja, as well as in Macedonia subjected to Serbia and 
Greece, the Bulgarian Church was abolished, the schools 
closed, the Bulgarian books burned, the name "Bulgarian" 
forbidden. It was in the part of Macedonia which was sub- 
jected to Serbia that the proscription of the Bulgarian nation- 
ality was the most ruthless. 

This is proven by the Serbian regulations on "Public Se- 
curiUi" in Macedonia, dated September 21, 1913, some articles 
of which deserve particular notice. 

Article 2. Any attempt at rebellion against the piiblic 
poivers is punishable by five years' penal servitude. 

The decision of the public authorities, published in the re- 
spective com-munes, is sufficient proof of the commission of 
crime. 

If the rebel refuses to give himself up as prisoner within 
ten days from, such publication, he may be put to death by any 
public or military officer. 

Article 3. Any person accused of rebellion in terms of the 
police decision and who commits any crime shall be punished 
with death. 

If the accused pei'son himself gives himself up as prisoner 
into the hands of the authorities, the death penalty shall be 
commuted to penal servitude for ten or twenty years, always 
provided that the commutation is approved by the tribunal. 

Article 4. "Where several cases of rebellion occur in a 
commune and the rebels do not return to their homes within 
ten days from the police notice, the authorities have the right 
of deporting their families whithersoever fhfiy m,ay find con- 
venient. ' !' v'^'^'15'*^ 

Likewise, the inhabitants of the houses in which armed 



19 

persons or criminals in general are fowid concealed, shall be 
deported. 

The heads of the police shall transmit to the Prefecture a 
report on the deportation procedure, which is to be put in 
force immediately. 

Article 5. Any person deported by an order of the Pre- 
fecture who shall return to his original domicile without the 
authorization of the Minister of the Interior shall be punished 
by three years' imprisonment. 

Article 6. If in any commune or any canton the mainte- 
nance of security demands the sending of troops, the main- 
renance of the latter shall be charged to the commime or the 
canton. In such a case the Prefect is to be notified. 

Article 8. Any person using any kind of explosives know- 
ing that such use is dangerous to the life and goods of others 
shall be punished with twenty years' penal sei-\4tude. * * * 

Article 11. Any person who uses an explosive without any 
evil intention, shall be punished by five years' penal servi- 
tude. 

Article 12. Anyone deliberately harming the roads, 
streets or squares in such a way as to endanger life or public 
health, shall be punished by fifteen years ' penal servitude. 

If the delinquency be unintentional the penalty shall be 
five years. * * * 

Article 14. Any person injuring the means of telegraphic 
or telephonic communication shall be punished by fifteen 
years' penal servitude. If the act is not premeditated the 
penalty shall be five years. * * * 

Article 16. Anyone ivho knouts a, malefactor and does not 
denounce him to the authorities shall be punished by five 
years' penal servitude. * * * 

Article 18. Any act of aggression and any resistance, 
either by word or force, offered to a public or communal offi- 
cer charged with putting in force a decision of the tribunal, or 
an order of the communal or police public authority, during 
the exercise of his duties, may be punished by ten years' penal 
servitude, or at least six months' imprisonment, however in- 
significant be the magnitude of the crime. 

Article 19. Where the crimes here enumerated are perpe- 
trated by an associated group of persons, the penalty shall 



20 

be fifteen years' penal servitude. The accomplices of those 
who committed the above mentioned misdeeds against public 
officials shall be punished by the maximum penalty, and, if 
this is thought insufficient, they may be condemned to penal 
servitude for a period amounting to twenty years. * * * 

Article 23. In the case of the constiniction of roads, or, 
generally speaking, of public works of all kinds, agitators 
who incite workmen to strike, or who are unwilling to work, 
or who seek to work elsewliere, or in another manner from 
that in which they are told, and who persist in such insubor- 
dination after notification by the authorities, shall be pun- 
ished by imprisonment from three months up to two years.* 

(Signed) Peter. 

Executed at Belgrade, September 21, 1913. 

VI. 

All its efforts to stop the hostilities, begun with Serbia 
and Greece having proved fruitless, the Daneff-Theodoroff 
Cabinet offered its resignation to the King. It was succeeded 
by V. Radoslavoff. 

The Daneff-Theodoroff Cabinet and, before it, the Guesh- 
off Cabinet, had followed, during aU their administration, the 
general lines of the policy of the Entente, and had sought 
particular support in Russia. The Radoslavoff Cabinet com- 
posed of the three factions of the anti-Russian party, adopt- 
ed for its program to steer Bulgaria towards Austria-Hun- 
gary. It was they who signed the treaty of Bucarest. 

This treaty left Bulgarian public opinion depressed and 
perplexed. The discussion of the events that had brought 
about the inter-allied war, in which, on the suppression of the 
censorship, the political parties engaged, made clear these 
three things: (1) that the order to tlie Bulgarian Fourth 
Army to attack the Serbian front in Macedonia had been 
given by General Savoff without the knowledge of the Gov- 
ernment; (2) that this criminal attempt against the policy 

(1) The full text of these regulations is found on pp. 160-162 of the 
"Report of the International Commission to inquire into the causes and 
coufluct of the Balkan Wars." published (1914) by the Carnegie Endow- 
ment for International Peace. And these Draconian laws were enacted by 
the Serbian Government for the administration of Macedonia, the population 
of which Serbians had proclaimed urbi et orhi to be genuinely Serbian! !^ 
Translator. 



21 

of the Government had not been conceived and executed under 
the influence of any foreign Power, too glad to find in Bulgaria 
a tool for breaking the Balkan Alliance ; but that it had been 
simply a foolhardy act of the Commander-in-Chief who, exas- 
perated by the refusal of Serbia to carry out the treaty of 

1912, believed, in agreement with King Ferdinand, that a 
short lucky attack on the Serbians would impress them, and 
make them fulfill their obligations in regard to Macedonia 
by accepting the arbitration of the Russian Emperor; (3) 
that the Entente in general and Russia in particular, had in- 
cessantly given Serbia urgent advice to respect her treaty 
and submit to the provided arbitration; but that the fixed 
determination of the Pashitch Cabinet to keep Macedonia at 
any price, and the declaration of the Serbian High Military 
Command that it would oppose with arms every solution 
which should deprive Serbia of the Vardar Valley, had cre- 
ated a situation, the growing tension of which, in driving the 
Bulgarian military circles to extremities, had brought about 
this lamentable issue of the Balkan Alliance. 

This examination of facts, pursued with an eager desire to 
establish the truth, quickened and deepened still more the 
hostility of Bulgarian public opinion to Serbia. It was proven 
that at no time had she thought of carrying out loyally her 
engagements by the treaty of 1912, that from the first months 
of the war she had entered into negotiations to circumvent 
Bulgaria, and in placing her before the dilemma of giving up 
Macedonia or finding herself in a struggle with a whole coali- 
tion, she had laid a trap for the Bulgarian anny, into which 
the blindness of General Savotf let it fall. On the other hand, 
the resentment which on the morrow of the peace of Bucarest 
the Bulgarians had felt against the Entente, under whose 
auspices Serbia, Greece and Rumania ostensibly placed the 
dismemberment of the Bulgarian territories which they had 
accomplished, calmed down. The enlightened part of public 
opinion in Bulgaria became more and more convinced that if 
the Entente had shown itself severe towards Bulgaria, it 
was due to over hasty inquiries, whereby it had gained the 
false impression that the Bulgarian Government had made 
itself against Serbia and the Balkan Alliance the tool of a 
foreign intrigue. 

The legislative elections fixed for the month of October, 

1913, gave to the Bulgarian people an occasion to affirm 
openly its unaltered sympathies for the Entente. These elec- 



22 

tions, as it happens almost always after an unfortunate war, 
had for their slogan the foreign policy of the country. The 
Radoslavoff Cabinet demanded from the body of electors to 
approve his policy of a closer union with Austria-Hungaiy ; 
the Opposition, composed of six parties representing the mass 
of the people and democratic ideals, declared energetically in 
favor of the traditional friendship for the Entente. The ver- 
dict of the nation was in favor of the Opposition. After hav- 
ing tried in vain to work with the National Assembly or Par- 
liament, Radoslavoff, supported by the King, dissolved it on 
Januaiy 14, 1914, and ordered new elections for the month 
of February. 'The new elections were made under great pres- 
sure on the part of the administration; the result was, how- 
ever, a new defeat of the Govei'nment. It succeeded this 
time, it is true, in gaining a majority of 13 votes; but this 
majority was due solely to the votes of the Turkish deputies 
who, to the number of 18, were returned from the newly an- 
nexed territory. Since then, one may justly say, Radoslavoff 
ruled against the legal will of the Bulgarian people. 

In the meantime, the European war broke out. At that 
moment, Bulgaria still had full liberty of action. The Rad- 
oslavoff Cabinet had parleyed with Vienna, but had taken no 
engagement. The only tie which up to that time existed be- 
tween Bulgaria and the Central PoAvers was the loan which 
the Government, with the help of Count Berchtold (Austrian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), had placed in Berlin, after it 
had made vain attempts at placing one on the Paris market. 
Even this loan was authorized by the German Government 
only after it had assured itself at Athens and Bucarest, that 
Greece and Rumania would not see in it any reason for alarm 
about the maintenance of the pronounced predilection shown 
to them for a long time by Germany. 

No sooner was the European war declared than the cool- 
ness which Emperor William, in order not to displease Greece 
and Rumania, had shown towards Bulgaria, made way for a 
strong pressure to draw Bulgaria to the side of Germany and 
launch her against Serbia. Seeing that the King and the 
Government held back, he set himself to convince them that 
Bulgaria's task would be easy, of very short duration, and 
that her neighbors, all bound in one way or another to Ger- 
many, would in no wise molest her. He insisted especially 
upon the last point. At the very outset, he made it known to 
the King and Radoslavoff that Turkey had been bound to him 



23 

by a formal alliance, and that Greece and Rumania would 
likewise side with him. King Constantine had in fact tele- 
graphed to the Kaiser — as the Greek White Book testifies — 
that in case Bulgaria joined the war as an ally of Germany, 
Greece would remain neutral. The Rumanian Government 
showed itself still more ardent. It informed directly Rados- 
lavoff that as the European war related to things outside of 
the Balkan combinations, it had broken the solidarity that 
bound Rumania to Serbia ; that the treaty of Bucarest did not 
interest Rumania any more except in the stipulations which 
concerned her directly, and that, finally, if Bulgaria should 
attack Serbia, she could count on Rumania's neutrality. 

All these communications had reached Sofia before the 
battle of the Mame. The advance of the Germans seemed 
irresistible and their triumph certain. Great was the tempta- 
tion for the King and Radoslavoff to take back Macedonia 
from the Serbians at the price of a war, which, as far as could 
be foreseen then, would have been quickly finished, and which, 
in view of the attitude taken bv the other Balkan States, all 
devoted at the time to Germany, would have remained local- 
ized. The King and Radoslavoff, however, rejected the sug- 
gestions of Berlin. 

The King as well as Radoslavoff leaned, no doubt, strongly 
toward an alliance with Germany ; the King on account of his 
old ties and his turn of mind which made him see in the Cen- 
tral Powers the strongest prop of the monarchical principle, 
and especially on account of the obsession that if Riissia 
should come triumphantlv out of the war and establish herself 
in Constantinople and Thrace, she would not fail to oust him 
from the throne by reason of the immense increase of influ- 
ence she would acquire over Bulgaria as a neighboring coun- 
try; Radoslavoff, because during all his political career, since 
1 886, he had been an avowed enemv of Russia. Still, neither the 
King nor his first minister had dared, in spite of their fore- 
gone decision, to bind Bulgaria to Germany. They both 
feared the resistance of the people and the counter-stroke of 
the Opposition. 

At the very beginning of the European War the Opposition 
had in fact declared for the Entente. The sentiment of grati- 
tude and the moral affinities that bound Bulgaria to Russia ; 
the admiration professed by the educated classes for England 
and France; the hope that from the victory of these demo- 



24 

cratic Powers would come for Europe a new order of things, 
based upon justice and the respect of nationalities— all this 
contributed to make the Opposition take an attitude distinctly 
favorable to the Entente. 

The Opposition did not disguise to itself the fact that a 
new war would not be popular in the country. The Bulgarian 
people had just come out of two extremely bloody wars. They 
seemed tired. On the other hand, the conduct of Serbia had 
left in their heart so much bitterness and a distrast so keen, 
that the idea of going to the aid of Serbia at no matter what 
promise, seemed to them a new imposture. Nevertheless, the 
Opposition was convinced that this state of mind was not 
irremediable. The prospect of being able to realize their 
national unity could obtain from the patriotism of the Bul- 
garian people a new effort. As to the distrust of Serbia, it 
might be overcome by a loyal offer on the part of Serbia to 
right the wrong she had committed in 1913, and to re-establish 
the relations between the two countries on the basis from 
which they ought never to have deviated. 

Serbia did not make the spontaneous move which the Bul- 
garian nation had a right to expect. Wlien the Bulgarian 
Minister at Belgrade told Pashitch that his Government had 
decided to remain neutral in the war between Serbia and Aus- 
tria-Hungary, the Serbian Prime Minister answered him with 
a few kind words, but said nothing about reparation. He 
also did not touch iipon the question of military co-operation 
between the two countries. 

During the first weeks of the war the Entente also did 
not ask for the effective co-operation of Bulgaria; they con- 
fined themselves simply to getting an assurance of her neu- 
trality. The entrance of Turkey into the war, by closing the 
Dardanelles and creating a diversion in the Caucasus and 
toward the Suez Canal, made the co-operation of Bulgaria de- 
sirable, and determined the Entente to make their first offers 
to Sofia. These offers related to the line of Enos-Midia and 
to Macedonia east of the Vardar, annexed to Serbia in virtue 
of the treaty of Bucarest. 

The Opposition parties kept advising Radoslavoff to join 
the Entente without any conditions, relying upon the princi- 
ples proclaimed by the Entente of the rights of nationalities 
and trusting to their fairness for the final settlement of the 
Balkan Question. The Opposition felt convinced that if the 



25 

Entente Powers had offered to Bulgaria, as a price for her 
co-operation, of all Macedonia under Serbian rule only a few 
small towns situated east of the Vardar, it was due to trans- 
ient difficulties which would disappear on the morrow of the 
common victory. The King and Radoslavoff, however, took 
another point of view. Their objection was that the recovery 
of a very small part of Macedonia could not justify in the 
eyes of the people the sacrifices of a new war, and so they re- 
plied to the propositions of the Entente by renewing the dec- 
laration of neutrality. 

The measures taken soon after for the expedition of the 
Dardanelles prove that the Entente did not count much on 
the co-operation of Bulgaria, but that they proposed to strike 
Turkey with their own means. From the end of the month 
of November, 1914, to the last days of the month of May, 1915, 
the Entente took no further formal steps to draw Bulgaria 
into the coalition. 

The current in favor of the Entente which had never 
ceased from increasing in all the classes of the Bulgarian na- 
tion had in the meantirne acquired special intensity. The ever 
increasing effect of the victoiy of the Marne which was 
deemed to have made fate definitely lean towards the Entente ; 
the quick organization of the British armies; the visible re- 
sults of the command of the seas; the resumed offensive of 
the Russian forces, which did not seem to have been affected 
by the sustained reverses, — all these reasons had shaken the 
confidence even of the narrow circles, which had been capti- 
vated at the beginning by the prestige of German might. The 
Government itself was seized with hesitation. At the time 
that the Russian armies penetrated victoriously into the de- 
files of the Carpathian Mountains and were already bending 
foi-ward towards the plains of Hungary, Radoslavoff, deeply 
impressed, discussed in a Cabinet Council the eventuality of 
immediately joining the Entente. The Dardanelles Expedi- 
tion caused the utmost uneasiness to the Government. Their 
emotion did not grow less when they heard that Italy's en- 
trance into the war was inaminent. During all this time, Rad- 
oslavoff was promising the Opposition that he would enter 
into an engagement with the Entente, as soon as he should re- 
ceive satisfactory propositions from them. 

In the meantime the Russian front at Dunajetz was pierced 
and the Russian army in Galicia had to beat a retreat. The 



26 

King and Radoslavoff regained confidence. It was then that 
the Entente took new steps at Sofia. On May 29, 1915, the 
four Entente Powers — inchiding Italy — handed to the Bul- 
garian Government an identical note couched in the following 
terms : 

"The Government of the four allied Powers have decided 
to make to the Royal Bulgarian Government the following 
declarations, if it is ready to begin operations against Turkey 
with all its armed forces : 

"1. The Allied Powers agree to the immediate occupa- 
tion by Bulgaria of Thrace up to the line of Enos-Midia, 
which shall become a Bulgarian possession. 

"2. The Allied Powers guarantee to Bulgaria, at the end 
of the war, the possession of the part of Macedonia bounded : 
(A) to the north and west, by tlie line Egri-Palanka, Sopot 
on the Vardar and Okhrida, the towns of Egri-Palanka, Keu- 
pnilu, Okhrida, Monastir being included therein; (B) to the 
south and east, by the actual Serbo-Greek and Serbo-Bul- 
garian frontiers. This undertaking is made subject to the fol- 
lowing conditions: (2) Serbia will receive fair compensations 
in Bosnia, in Herzegovina and on the Adriatic coast; (b) 
Bulgaria will make no attempt at occupying any part what- 
ever of the above indicated territory before the conclusion of 
peace. 

"3. The Allied Powers pledge themselves to use all their 
efforts with the Greek Government to secure the cession of 
Cavalla to Bulgaria. As the Allied Powers, in order to do 
this, ought to be in a position to offer to Greece fair compen- 
sations in Asia Minor, the Bulgarian army ought to begin 
operations against Turkey. 

"4. The Allied Powers are inclined to favor the negotia- 
tions which Bulgaria and Rumania might desire to open in 
view of settling the question of Dobrudja. 

"5. Finally, the Allied Powers bind themselves to furnish 
Bulgaria with every financial assistance she may need." 

The new propositions constituted a great step in advance : 
(1) they embi'aced the Bulgarian question in its entirety; (2) 
they came considerably near the principle of nationalities. 
The King and Radoslavoff did not dare thrust them aside. 
To the offer of the Entente the Bulgarian Government replied 
by a note of which the salient passages were these : 



27 

"Highly appreciating the confidence with which the Allied 
Powers have been pleased to honor it, the Royal Government 
considers it its duty to observe that the propositions stated 
in the said declarations present certain points not quite pre- 
cise, of the exact sense and true bearing of which it would 
like to be made certain, ere it takes the decision which they 
admit of. 

"It would be proper therefore to know if the part of Mace- 
donia, the retrocession of which the four Powers have in view, 
corresponds exactly with the territory which constitutes the 
so-called "uncontested zone," and of which the map is at- 
tached to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912. Moreover, the 
Allied Powers make this retrocession subject to Serbia's ob- 
taining of fair compensations in Bosnia, Herzegovina and 
on the Adriatic Sea. Concerning these three regions, the 
Royal Government would find it expedient to be informed of 
the limits within which the compensation will be made, so as 
to create incontestable rights in favor of Bulgaria. 

"The Royal Government should likewise have precise in- 
formation of the same kind in regard to the compensations re- 
served for Greece in Asia Minor. 

"As to the question of Dobnidja-for the settlement of which 
the Allied Powers offer so obli.gingly their good offices, the 
Royal Government W'ould be very grateful to the Governments 
of these powers if they would be so kind as to indicate to it 
what are in their opinion, the principles which should serve 
as a basis for the understanding to be concluded between Ru- 
mania and Bulgaria." 

This note of the Bulgarian Government was dated June 14, 
1915. Up to August 3d, it remained unanswered. This silence 
did not mean at all that the Entente was at a loss what preci- 
sions to give Bulgaria, or that it demurred at the principle 
itself of its offers. As a matter of fact, the Allied Powers had 
made use of this delay and taken steps with Serbia, Greece 
and Rumania for the purpose of winning them to their views 
regarding a new settlement of the Balkan Question. 

Unfortunately, these steps did not have the desired effect. 
In Greece the ideas of the Entente had found, it is true, an 
echo in Venizelos ; but King Constantine, more and more sub- 
servient to Germany and supported therein by the political 
parties in the kingdom, had replied to the counsels of his first 
minister by asking him to resign. In Rumania, the influence 



28 

of Germany at that time was also great. Strongly impressed 
by the Russian retreat in Galicia and starting from the idea, 
then as since, that Rumania ought to make her policy subject 
to the situation on the eastern front, the Cabinet of Bratiano 
had dropped all parleys with the Entente. Sounded by the 
Bulgarian Government on the subject of a new settlement of 
the question of Dobrudja, which had been annexed to Ruma- 
nia in 1913, he answered without any circumlocution that he 
would make no concessions, no matter at what price, and that 
to revert to the question would be displeasing to him. He 
added, however, that as the claims of Bulgaria had for their 
chief object Macedonia, he would gladly see Bulgaria retake, 
by means that seemed best to her, that part of her patrimony. 
The communication which Bratiano had sent in the month 
of August, 1914, to the Bulgarian Government that Rumania 
would remain neutral in case Bulgaria should attack Serbia, 
all the declarations which he had made since and which were 
conducive to the belief that Rumania would remain faithful 
to her traditional policy, made it possible for German diplo- 
macy to make Radoslavoff believe that the ascendency of the 
Central Powers remained always intact at Bucarest. 

The steps taken by the Entente with the Serbian Govern- 
ment did not also have the results which they had a right to 
expect. After the Bulgarian note of June 14, 1915, the four 
Allied Powers had exerted upon Serbia very strong pressure 
with a view to inducing her to cede to Bulgaria that part of 
Macedonia, called the uncontested Zone, to which the Serbians 
had waived all claims by the treaty of 1912. This determined 
attitude of the Entente called forth amongthe Serbians a storm 
of indignation. The Press unanimously declared that Serbia 
would never consent to the sacrifices, which, were demanded 
of her for the triumph of the common cause. Several Serbian 
newspapers openlv remarked that if the Entente needed new 
allies, they should make concessions from their own terri- 
tories. Others went so far as to warn Bulgaria that if she 
should receive Macedonia from the hands of the Entente by 
diplomatic means, the Serbians would not be long in retaking 
it from her by arms. 

The members of the Serbian Cabinet were not the least 
eager in this campaign against steps taken by the Entente. 
On August 15th, the day of the anniversary of King Ferdi- 
nand's accession to the throne, Pashitch, having gone to the 
Bulgarian Legation at Belgrade to offer the congratulations 



29 

of the Serbian Government, told the Ministei' of Bulgaria that 
Serbia was inclined to enter the path of concessions, but she 
would accept in no way to restore to Bulgaria Macedonia up 
to the line of the treaty of 1912. 

The following day, August 16th, the Serbian Parliament 
was convoked at Nish at an extraordinary session. After 
Pashitch had given an account of the steps of the Entente, the 
Parliament voted a resolution by which it accepted the prin- 
ciple of a territorial concession to Bulgaria, on condition that 
the vital interests of Serbia were safeguarded." 

The formula vital interests brought the Serbo-Bulgarian 
question back to the point where it was in 1913, before the 
inter-allied war, when Serbia refused to carry out her treaty 
with Bulgaria. In fact by vital interests the Serbian Govern- 
ment and Parliament understood in 1915 as in 1913 the pos- 
session of the Vardar Valley and a common frontier with 
Greece. In other words, the Serbian Parliament, as well as 
Pashitch, refused to restore Macedonia up to the line of the 
treaty of 1912. 

Now, it was precisely this which the four Allied Powers 
had proposed to the Bulgarian Government by a note dated 
August 3, 1915. This note contained precisions and guaran- 
ties which made the offers of the Entente still more satisfac- 
tory. This note was not made public in Bulgaria. The En- 
tente itself had demanded the most absolute secrecy about 
its negotiotions with Bulgaria, because it Avished to avoid the 
emotion which its offers were sure to produce in Serbia and 
the other Balkan States, and eventually might have hampered 
either the conduct of the war in the Balkans — voices were 
being already raised at Nish for a separate peace, — or the 
ulterior political combinations with Greece and Rumania. 
Radoslavoff took advantage of the discretion demanded by 
the Allied Powers, and forbade every discussion in the press 
of the last propositions made to Bulgaria. 

The regime which the Radoslavoff Cabinet had imposed 
on Bulgaria since August, 1914, made any au'itation by the 
Opposition in favor of its ideas impossible. The newspapers 
were subjected to a preventive censorship; the state of siege 
was in full swing. The arrest of Mr. Krustef¥, professor at 

(l> The above statements dispose of the false assertion made by the 
Serbians then and since that Serbia had offered to make concessions to 
Bulgaria in Macedonia, including even the town of Monastir. — Translator. 



' 30 

the University of Sofia, who was prosecuted for having com- 
posed a manifesto, soon covered with a great number of sig- 
natures of political, parliamentary, literary and industrial 
persons, in favor of Bulgaria's entrance into the war on the 
side of the Entente, showed that the Government would not 
hesitate in repressing harshly any movement contrary to its 
views. 

In spite of the menace hanging over them, the Opposition 
made use of all the means at their disposal to turn away Bul- 
garia from the path into which evil guides were intending to 
lead her. The parties of which it was composed, the same 
that constitute the present Cabinet, warned the Government 
especially against the terrible responsibility which it would 
assume, if it should commit the crime of pushing Bulgaria 
into a war against the Entente. Eadoslavoff reassured them 
by telling them that he had entered into no engagement with 
any Power. 

This was true up to September 6, 1915, but on that day 
he signed a treaty with the Central Powers. The Opposition 
knew nothing of this, because the King and Radoslavoff sur- 
rounded their actions with the greatest mystery. Meanwhile, 
a general mobilization was ordered. Even after this weighty 
measure, the King and the Cabinet tried to deceive popular 
opinion. The reservists were told that they were called under 
the colors to defend the neutrality of Bulgaria, which was 
threatened by the near eventuality of an Austro-German drive 
through Serbia towards Constantinople. To the chiefs of the 
Opposition, Radoslavoff said, that he had mobilized the army 
in order to be more ready for a quick action against Turkey, 
as soon as his negotiations with the Entente should reach 
an agreement, which secured efficacious gnarantees for the 
achievement of the national unity. 

What one saw of the preparations of the Government, how- 
ever, gave the lie to Eadoslavoff 's assurances. Soon no doubt 
was left that we were face to face with a concerted plan with 
the Central Powers. Then the Opposition parties took a last 
step ; they asked to be received by the King and appealed to 
his own responsibility. The King appeared to them firm and 
decided. He imagined that the war was drawing to its end, 
and that Bulgaria's part in it would be confined to the occu- 
pation of the Bulgarian regions under the Serbian domina- 
tion. The attitude of King Constantine, from whom he had 



31 

.received a formal promise of neutrality, the blandishing dec- 
larations of Rumania, whence likewise a promise of neutrality 
had reached him by way of Berlin, made him certain that no 
difficulty was to be feared from the neighboring States. Nor 
did he believe that the evolution of the war would set him by 
the ears with the Entente. To the observations that were 
made to him by several persons, that the Entente Powers 
would not forsake Serbia, and that instead of a short and 
localized campaign, Bulgaria would have to wage a war, long 
and of doubtful issue, against Powers to which he was at- 
tached by her traditions, her sentiments and her interests, 
the Kmg replied with an air of conviction that if such an 
eventuality were really to be feared, it would stay his hand, 
but that it was not at all probable. Explaining himself on 
the subject, he said that a landing at Dedeagatch being, for 
material reasons, impossible, the forces of the Entente could 
not get at the Bulgarian anny except through Salonica; but 
this access was closed to them by the decision of King Con- 
stantine, who had formally engaged himself to oppose every 
violation of the neutrality of Greece. The calmness with 
which the King learned of the mobilization of the Greek army 
was the best proof of the promises he had received from the 
Court of Athens. 

It was under the sway of this injudicious optimism that 
the King ordered the offensive against Serbia. The Bulgarian 
army started on this new war with a heavy heart, but resigned. 
The High Militai-y Command published a Draconian decree, 
having the force of law, which added to the cases foreseen 
by the criminal code more than twenty cases punishable with 
death. Some hundreds of soldiers, wdio had refused to obey, 
and had declared that they did not wish to fight either the 
Entente or its Allies, were mercilessly shot. All the large 
units were accompanied by courts-martial which tried cases 
summarily and executed their sentences without delay. More 
than six thousand sentences of death, pronounced and exe- 
cuted during the war, bear witness to the terror that weighed 
upon the army. The terror to which the rear was subjected 
was not less relentless. For having warned the King that in 
doing violence to the conscience of the people he was exposing 
himself to their wrath, Mr. Stamboliski, one of the chiefs of 
the Opposition, and a member of the present Cabinet, was 
indicted and condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Other 
political trials, followed by harsh punishments, showed that 



LIBRfiRY OF CONGRESS 



32 020 914 585 6 

the King and the Government would not shrink at any means 
to break all resistance to their policy. 

Under these conditions — ^unless a revolution had been made 
■for which they had not the means any more than they could 
calculate its consequences — the people had to submit. They 
did so. The army on its part acquitted itself of the task im- 
posed upon it. The prospect of retaking Macedonia which the 
Serbians had usurped by breaking their plighted word, stifled 
in the soldiers during the battles the horror they felt at a war 
in which the Turks were their allies and the Russians their 
foes. But Macedonia once occupied, the army was seized 
again with its repugnance to the mmatural alliance into which 
the Government had pushed it. The necessity in which the 
Bulgarian soldier found himself to fight on the Macedonian 
front against four great European nations, of which he had 
always heard that they were the protectors of Bulgaria, put 
him in a violent moral crisis. This crisis was transformed 
into a latent revolt when the United States entered the fray. 
The newspapers of Sofia had published the fourteen points 
of the memorable message of President Wilson. The troops 
which had learned of it — for there are hardly any illiterates 
among the young classes of the Bulgarian army — began to 
asji themselves thenceforward with anguish, whether there 
was any sense in continuing to fight against a coalition to- 
wards which they were animated by no hatred whatsoever, 
and which, through the President of the United States, had 
proclaimed once again the principles which Bulgaria pleaded 
in favor of her cause and beyond which she asked for nothing. 
Thenceforth, the Bulgarian war against the Entente was vir- 
tually ended. 

The rest is known. 



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